Phil 414 – Philosophy of Law
Instructor: Ken Himma
Office: Savery M347C
Telephone: 543.5384
e-mail: himma@u.washington.edu
Office
Hours: TBA
Website: http://faculty.washington.edu/himma
Texts: H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford UP, 1994); Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (Harvard UP, 1978)
Course Description: In this course, we will be concerned with attempts to
explain the content of the concept of law, which usually proceed by describing
existence conditions for law. In
particular, we will examine a variety of classical and contemporary accounts of
law, including classical natural law theory, legal positivism, and Dworkin’s
third theory of law. Along the way, we
will consider a number of theoretical issues: (1) What is the relationship
between the concepts of law and morality?
Are there conceptually necessary moral constraints on the content of
law? (2) Does law have a special
function that distinguishes it from other normative systems? (3) How does law create (legal) obligations? (4) What does it mean to say that someone or
some norm is “authoritative?” (5) What
does judicial disagreement in hard cases tell us about the nature of law? (6) If law is wholly conventional in
character, can there be moral constraints on the content of law? (7) What is the proper methodology for
theorizing about the nature of law? (8)
Is there any point to theorizing about the nature of law? There are no prerequisites for this course
other than a willingness to think deeply about these issues.
Course Requirements: There will be a midterm and final exam worth 100
points each. At the student’s election,
a term paper of 12 to 15 pages may be substituted for one of the exams. With instructor approval, a term paper of 22
to 25 pages may be substituted for both exams.
Grading policy:
Your writing assignments,
including exams, will be graded with the following considerations in mind: (1)
organizational structure; (2) substantive content (including quality of
explanations and analysis); and (3) quality of writing.
Your analysis and writing should be addressed to a
reasonably intelligent audience unfamiliar with the material (i.e., people who
have not taken this course). Key
concepts and principles should be explained, rather than assumed, in reasonably
accessible language. In addition, all of
the critical steps in your argument and supporting analysis should be explicit
and organized in a logical way. (It will
help, I think, if you think of yourself as teaching the material to the reader.) In
general, your writing should be clear, concise, and free of grammatical errors.
Electronic Reserves: All readings not in the
text will be on e-reserves. The course
page can be found at:
https://eres.lib.washington.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=2419
.
Course
Week 1 (9/29-10/3): Course Introduction and Classical
Natural Law Theory
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica I-II
William Blackstone, Commentaries,
38-40
John Austin, Province of
Jurisprudence Determined, 157-159
Week 2 (10/6-10/10): Early Positivism: The Command
Theory of Law
Austin, Province,
Lectures I, VI
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept
of Law, 26-35, 82-85
Week 3 (10/13-10/17): Hartian Positivism I: Law as
the
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Chapters 5
and 6
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
Chapter 3 (excerpt)
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1-11, 15-20,
31-46
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Postscript,
244-248
Week 4 (10/20-10/24): Hartian Positivism II: The
Concept of Legal Obligation and Judicial Discretion
Roger
Shiner, Norm and Nature, Chapter 6 (excerpt)
Andrei
Marmor, “Legal Conventionalism,” (excerpt)
Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Chapters 2 and 4 (excerpts)
Week 5 (10/27-10/31): Dworkin’s Third Theory of Law
Dworkin, “Natural Law
Revisited”
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Chapter 3
Himma,
“Trouble in Law’s Empire”
First Exam: Tuesday, October 28
Week 6 (11/3-11/7): Inclusive Legal Positivism and
the Problem of Authority
Joseph
Raz, “Authority, Law, and Morality”
Dworkin,
“Thirty Years On”
Stephen
Perry, “Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law”
Jules
Coleman, “Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis”
Week 7 (11/10-11/14): Inclusive Legal Positivism,
Legal Functionalism and the Practical Difference Thesis
Scott
Shapiro, “On Hart’s Way Out”
Jules Coleman, “Incorporationism,
Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis”
Matthew
Kramer, “How Morality Can Figure Into the Law”
Himma,
“H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis”
No Class: Tuesday, November 11
Week 8 (11/17-11/21): The Methodology of Analytic
Jurisprudence
Hart, The Concept of Law, Preface and 239-244
Neil MacCormick, “A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic
Law?”
Perry, “The Varieties of Legal Positivism”
Perry, “Hart’s Methodological Positivism”
Week 9 (11/24-11/28): The Methodology of Analytic
Jurisprudence (cont.)
Brian
Leiter, “Naturalism, and Naturalized Jurisprudence”
Frank
Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics, Chapters 1 and 2
No Class: Thursday,
November 27
Week 10 (12/1-12/5): TBA